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Antitrust
By Kurt A. Strasser*

I. INTRODUCTION
In 1980 there were twenty-one antitrust related opinions in the Fifth
Circuit. This is about the number of opinions of each of the last few
years. Overall, evidentiary and procedural questions were prominent.
However, two cases did articulate new analytical structures for existing
substantive law. These were, respectively, application of a new approach
to evaluating conduct traditionally labelled as business torts,' and an attempt to articulate a "facial" rule of reason to supplement the traditional
dichotomy of the per se rule and the rule of reason.' In addition, 1980 saw
a substantial decline in the number and importance of cases dealing with
vertical business practices.
For purposes of convenience, this article will be organized into five categories. An initial discussion of cases dealing with horizontal restraints
will be followed by cases dealing with vertical restraints. Then, exemptions and immunities will be discussed. These will be followed by procedural questions and the usual miscellaneous section.

II. HoRIzoNTAL REsTIUNTs
The horizontal restraints cases presented problems of boycotts, refusal
to sell, business torts and a number of evidentiary and procedural
problems. The most substantial of these was the boycott case of United
States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc.3 Defendant, a real estate multiple listings service, imposed three membership requirements which were at issue.4 First, each member was required to maintain an active real estate
*

Professor of Law, Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University. Vanderbilt Uni-

versity (B.A., 1969; J.D., 1972). Columbia University (LL.M., 1979). Member of the State
Bars of Georgia and Tennessee.
1. See text accompanying notes 20-27 infra.
2. See United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351 (5th Cir. 1980).
3. Id.
4. Defendant also required that members be licensed brokers and agree to abide by the
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office in Muscogee County, Georgia, open during normal business hours.
Second, members were required to have a favorable credit report and
business reputation. Finally, an applicant was required to purchase one
share of stock, presently valued at $1,000, as a condition of membership.
The government attacked these three requirements arguing, alternatively,
that they amounted to a per se illegal group boycott, that they were overbroad and hence unreasonable on their face, and that they were unreasonable on the specific facts. The trial court's summary judgment for defendant was reversed and remanded by the Fifth Circuit.
The court first held that this arrangement should not be subject to per
se treatment. Discussing the rationale underlying all per se rules in light
of recent Supreme Court decisions,8 the court determined that not all refusals to deal should be categorized as per se illegal boycotts. The court
developed a two-part analysis to evaluate the conventional test of purpose
and effect; first, whether there was "purposely exclusionary or coercive
conduct" and, second, whether the activity was ancillary to efficiency creating practices.7 The court found that the real estate multiple listing service contributed to efficiency by improving information and communication for buyers, sellers and financiers. To exist, the service had to pay the
cost of its operations, and some membership criteria were necessary to
maintain minimum standards for the members of the service. These contributions to the operations of efficient markets made per se illegality inappropriate, even though the arrangement might also have had an exclusionary effect. In so holding, the court avoided a simplistic application of
the broad language of the prior per se boycott cases.8
The court then proceeded to a rule of reason evaluation. It apparently
adopted, uncritically, the government's assertion that there is a "facial"
rule of reason distinct from the traditional rule of reason. By the court's
brief explanation, this facial rule of reason evaluates whether the particular restrictions, on their face, are required to achieve the claimed efficiency, without an in-depth examination of the specific facts. 9 In the
court's view, a facial examination was appropriate because of the likelihood of competitive harm of exclusion; this was a particularly likely reorganization's bylaws. 629 F.2d at 1358 n.14. It had previously imposed other requirements,
but these had been dropped in prior negotiations with the government.
5. 629 F.2d at 1362-65. The three Supreme Court decisions are Broadcast Music, Inc. v.
CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979); National Society of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S.
679 (1978); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
6. See generally L. SULLIVAN, Az~rrrrusT § 90 (1977).
7. 629 F.2d at 1366-67.
8. See generally L. SULLIVAN, supra note 6, §§ 89-90.
9. 629 F.2d at 1369. While the court did not discuss this new analytical construction in
much detail, it has a striking resemblance to the two-part analysis used in determining the
constitutionality of statutes.
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suit in this case because the association was involved in the actual business of its members and it had sufficient economic power to shape its
competitive environment.10 The court cited no authority for this new analytical structure and, despite three recent Supreme Court cases dealing
with the scope of the rule of reason and the per se rule, this writer is
aware of none.11 This new facial rule of reason appears to have little practical utility as an analytical tool. It is unlikely to make trials shorter or
more focused by reducing the very broad scope of relevant evidence in the
initial trial."2 For the same reason, it seems unlikely to improve the ability of business parties to determine antitrust legality in advance. In addition, it can potentially divert attention from the actual competitive impact of the specific practices and their market context, which is the heart
of true rule of reason analysis.18 While it is not directly misleading, this
new analytical structure adds a layer of complexity to antitrust decision
14
making without affording any compensating clarity or enlightenment.
The court then proceeded to evaluate the reasonableness of the specific
restraints."8 It first considered the requirement of a favorable credit report and favorable business reputation. Because Georgia regulates real estate brokers extensively, the court held that this further evaluation would
be justified only if the real estate multi-listing service could show why
10. Id. at 1370.
11. See 441 U.S. 1; 435 U.S. 679; 433 U.S. 36. In Broadcast Music, Inc., the Court did
articulate the inquiry that one should look at the competitive effect of a practice to see if it
"facially appears" always to restrict competition. 441 U.S. at 19-21. However, that reference
is followed by a discussion of the pro-efficiency justifications of the practices involved, presumably indicating that the Court was rejecting the traditional per se rule because the requisite "facial appearance" of anticompetitive effect did not exist. In any event, it seems
unlikely that the Court would adopt a whole new analytical structure supplementing the
traditional per se/rule of reason dichotomy with an off-hand reference.
12. Presumably, parties will not know prior to trial and during trial whether the new
facial rule of reason or the old detailed rule of reason is applicable. In addition, a party can
always broaden the scope of the trial by claiming that the specific facts provide the reasonableness justification even though these do not appear in the facial analysis.
The Court stated that this facial rule of reason would be applied only to parties having
market power. However, if the conduct can be justified by an inquiry into the specifics of
the market situation, the justification might appropriately survive even for a party with
market power.
13. See generally C. KAYSRN & D. TURNER, ANTrrRUST POLICY (1959); L. SULLIVAN, supra
note 6, §§ 63-72; 2 P. AREDA & D. TURNER, Aerrrus'r LAW § 314 (1978).
14. For a brief discussion of alternatives to the rule of reason, see Strasser, Vertical
Territorial Restraints After Sylvania: A Policy Analysis And Proposed New Rule, 1977
DuKE L.J. 775, 830-34; Bohling, A Simplified Rule of Reason for Vertical Restraints: Integrating Social Goals, Economic Analysis and Sylvania, 65 IowA L. REv. 461, 490-523
(1978). See generally Note, A Suggested Rule for Rebuttable Presumptions in Antitrust
Restraintive Trade Litigation, 1972 Ducz L.J. 595.
15. 629 F.2d at 1374-87.
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Georgia's regulations, or their enforcement, are inadequate. The vague-

ness and subjectivity of these standards make them particularly suspect.
The court then held this restriction unreasonable on its face because it
was overbroad and not narrowly tailored to serve a legitimate goal in the
least restrictive manner. The requirement that members have an office
open during customary hours met much the same fate. While require-

ments related to the legitimate needs of generating listings and providing
services would be permissible, the customary business hours requirement
is overbroad and not sufficiently related to achieving these goals in the
least restrictive manner.' 6 Similarly, the $1,000 stock purchase requirement was held to be unreasonable on its face because it was not related to

the cost of operation or pro rata share of start up costs. The court did
note that it would be reasonable to charge a fee which did reflect these

costs. 17 Despite the trial court's summary judgment for the defendant, the
court, applying its new analytic structure, found these restrictions unreasonable on their face. The same result could have been reached under a
traditional rule of reason requirement that the least restrictive alternative
be used even when a restraint is justified. 6 The case was remanded to the
trial court to determine whether there was sufficient interstate commerce

involved and whether defendant has a sufficient degree of market power
to apply its facial rule of reason test.1"'
Associated Radio Service Co. v. Page Airways, Inc.10 concerned a claim

that defendant had used unfair competitive tactics to accomplish a horizontal restraint of trade. Plaintiff was a company which installed electronic equipment (avionics) on a number of airplanes, including the
Grumman Gulfstream II (G-HI).2 1 About twenty of these airplanes were
made per year, and plaintiff had been installing avionics on about half of

them. Defendant had been the sole sales representative for the G-II and
16. Id. at 1383-85.
17. Id. at 1385-87. The court also held that issues related to specific restrictions abandoned in negotiations prior to the suit were not moot.
18. L. Sullivan, supra note 6, §§ 63-72.
19. The court also gave potentially conflicting instructions to the trial court. Earlier in
the opinion, it expressly left open for future trial court determination questions of the
amount of defendant's market power and the extent to which state preemption by regulation existed. 629 F.2d at 1383 n.67. However, in the conclusion, the court stated that the
case was being remanded for determination of the questions of interstate commerce effect
and degree of defendant's market power. While this is not a serious conflict, there does seem
to be some confusion regarding the extent to which the trial court should consider antitrust
immunity arising from state regulation.
20. 624 F.2d 1342 (5th Cir. 1980). A monopolization claim was also presented. It will be
discussed below.
21. Id. at 1345. Claims presented by plaintiff's wholly owned subsidiary were dismissed
on standing grounds. Id. at 1348. The trial court defined a product market of the installation of G-I1 avionics; this was affirmed on appeal. Id. at 1348-50.
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had previously contracted with plaintiff for installation of the avionics.
Defendant decided to enter the avionics installation business, and it hired
away several of plaintiff's key employees, including plaintiff's president.
The trial court found that defendant stole trade secrets and proprietary
information from plaintiff and that it caused plaintiff's employees to work
secretly for defendant prior to leaving plaintiff's employ.22 As a result,
defendant avoided the claimed two and one-half year learning curve in
the avionics installation business; its avionics business took over most of
plaintiff's market share and became profitable almost immediately. Plaintiff alleged that this course of conduct was intended to eliminate it as a
competitor and charged violations of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act.22 Judgment on a jury verdict for plaintiff was affirmed.
The section 1 claim was evaluated by a rule of reason. Quoting extensively from Northwest Power Products, Inc. v. Omark Industries,2" the
court articulated a two-part test for determining the antitrust legality of
unfair competition claims: "(1) A market effect that would be prohibited
under the law of mergers; and (2) other conduct by defendant that
threatens Sherman Act values."' Because defendant was a potential entrant and plaintiff originally had a large market share, the court held that
a horizontal merger between the two would have been illegal,26 and thus
the first part of this test was met. This result demonstrates the irrationality of this test. If plaintiff had a smaller market share prior to the conduct in question, presumably the conduct would have been permissible.
Yet a party with a smaller market share will typically be less able to protect itself against allegedly unfair competition. Similar problems exist
with the second part of the test. The court found that defendant was able
to raise prices after it gained market share, thus violating Sherman Act
values. Yet this conclusion requires the assumption that purchasers of the
five million dollar aircraft were making the irrational decision to pay
more for avionics which could have been purchased for less elsewhere."
The difficulty with this part of the opinion reflects the basic conflict
between antitrust and unfair competition law.28 Antitrust law is aimed at

22. Id. at 1346-47. Plaintiff charged that defendant was bribing foreign officials to obtain
their business and that it was charging higher prices; the court appeared persuaded of this
latter charge. Id. at 1348, 1352-53 n.20.
23. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1976).
24. 576 F.2d 83 (5th Cir. 1978).
25. 624 F.2d at 1351.
26, Id. at 1352.
27. Defendant argued that relative prices were not comparable because different buyers
purchase different avionics packages. In concluding that defendant raised prices, the court
made no allowance for either the avionics package purchased or the effects of inflation. Id.
at 1352-53 n.19.
28. Note, Antitrust Treatment of Competitive Torts: An Argument for a Rule of Per Se
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protecting competitive processes; unfair competition law is aimed at
maintaining minimum standards of decency in business conduct. Given
this conflict, clearly articulated standards are needed if antitrust actions
are to be based on conduct traditionally labeled unfair competition. Otherwise, courts and business parties will not be able to predict the antitrust status of specific competitive conduct and will be less likely to compete vigorously or effectively2s While common law recovery for unfair
competition has some blunting effect on competition, the treble damages
and potential criminal liability of antitrust law make it a much greater
deterrent. Unless a rule can be devised to articulate clearly what competition is unfair, antitrust law should avoid policing unfair competition. 0
The court applied traditional criteria to uphold the finding of a violation of section 2'of the Sherman Act. 1 Market power was inferred from
defendant's market share, the small number of competitors and the presence of high entry barriers. The unfair competition here was, in the
court's view, sufficiently exclusionary'to constitute monopolization. 3 As
with the section 1 claim, the problem here was the competition-blunting
effect of the failure to indicate what kinds of competitive conduct will be
permissible and what will be prohibited.
The other major horizontal practices case, Almeda Mall, Inc; v. Houston Light and Power, Co.88 concerned defendant power company's refusal
to sell electricity at bulk rate to plaintiff's malls because they planned to
resell to the specific tenants. The bulk rate was cheaper, and plaintiff
planned to make the retail selling profit in resales to its tenants. Defendant was granted a directed verdict on plaintiff's Sherman Act section 1
complaint, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed. Defendant had sought to justify its refusal by arguing that this kind of reselling led to unsatisfactory
service, maintenance and repair." Although the court did not appear to
notice, this argument is seriously undermined by the fact that apartment
buildings, office buildings and older retail store buildings all purchase for
Legality Under the Sherman Act, 58 Tux. L. Rzv. 415, 421 (1980).
29. Id. The note presents an argument for per se antitrust legality
to avoid this

disincentive.
30. The lack of such a clear standard may have contributed to the result here, i.e., finding antitrust liability without a persuasive showing of harm to competition. It appears only
that one large market share entity has been substituted for another.
31. The jury instructions permitted it to find monopolization, conspiracy to monopolize
or attempt to monopolize, without specifying which. Since these have different elements, the
instructions are most questionable. The court affirmed the jury charge in one short, conclusory paragraph followed by almost three pages of footnoted quotation from it. 624 F.2d
at 1358-61.
32. Id. at 1354-55.
33. 615 F.2d 343 (5th Cir. 1980).
34. Id. at 347-48.
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resale to tenants8 5 The court held that there was no injury to competition
from the refusal because, in its view, economies of scale at the distribu-'
tion level would prevent any real competition." Thus the court concluded, there could be no public injury resulting because no competition
can be harmed. 7 It distinguished Otter Tail Power Co. v. United
States,8s labeling as wholesale the sales made in that case to purchasing
municipalities for resale; the sales for resale at issue in Almeda Hall were
labeled as retail.89 While the court's result is clearly in keeping with traditional, static price theory which underlies much of the present thinking
about antitrust policy, it overlooks potentially important dynamic factors.
Even if competition among different retailers within these particular
shopping malls is not possible, the substitution of a different monopolist
at the independent distributor level can, potentially, be a price restraining factor on the monopolist at the transmission level. Such an independent distributor can, if forced, pursue alternative resources of supply or consider alternative generating technologies.4 0 However, it is
perhaps unfair to fault the court for merely failing to expand the horizons
of conventional antitrust analysis.
Two other cases presented potential horizontal restraints problems. In
Pan-Islamic Trade Corp. v. Exxon Corp.,41 plaintiff, a corporation
formed to buy and resell Algerian oil, alleged a conspiracy to exclude it by
the major oil companies. After a careful review of the record and summary of the evidence, the court affirmed the trial court's summary judgment for defendant, agreeing that'no evidence supporting an inference of
35. Id. at 348.
36. For a short discussion of economies of scale at the generating, transmission, and distribution levels, respectively, in the electric power industry, see W. Slm'MnD & C. WnLcox,
PUBLIC POLICIES TowARD BuslN~ss at 322-24 (1979).
37. "In this circuit to succeed with a private antitrust action alleging an unreasonable
restraint of trade, one must show more than a violation of antitrust law and damage to
himself. He must show that the alleged unreasonable restraint tends to or is resonably calculated to prejudice the public interest." 615 F.2d at 351 (emphasis by the court). The
conventional assumption of antitrust law is that the public is injured by any injury to competition. While the court's language here appears overbroad, the result in the case is quite
justifiable.
38. 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
39. The municipalities in Otter Tail were purchasing for redistribution to an entire municipal area. Here, the shopping malls wished to purchase for redistribution only in the mall.
This size difference in the quantity redistributed appears to be the only economically meaningful distinction between the operations in the two cases.
40. In this case, Houston Power & Light had a nonexclusive license to distribute electricity. 615 F.2d at 352. However, the economies of scale and distribution may make this legally
nonexclusive right economically exclusive in practical application. The possibility of the use
of alternative generating technologies for a user of this size is not as far-fetched as it may
initially appear. See Electricity Cogeneration, Fo~rTuNz, Dec. 31, 1978, at 80.
41. 632 F.2d 539 (5th Cir. 1980).
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conspiracy had been presented." In St. Bernard Hospital v. Hospital
Services Association, Inc.," the court refused to conclude on appeal that
no horizontal conspiracy had been alleged and therefore did not affirm
the lower court's summary judgment on this alternative ground." The
court did state "there has been little proper consideration by St. Bernard
of the nature of the antitrust laws." ' "4The lower court's grant of summary
judgment was reversed on other grounds."
III.

VERTICAL

RESTRAINTS

Four of the Fifth Circuit's antitrust decisions in 1980 concerned vertical restrictions. The first two of these decisions dealt with allegations of
7
vertical refusal to deal. Blackburn v. Crum and Forster1
grew out of a
commercial dispute concerning issuance of an insurance policy on a warehouse that burned. That dispute led to separate litigation in the Texas
courts. As a result of this dispute, defendant terminated the "errors and
omissions" coverage of plaintiff insurance sales agency. Because of the
denial of errors and omissions coverage, other companies in defendant's
group were reluctant to deal with plaintiffs. Plaintiffs alleged that the
vertical refusal to deal stemmed from an illegal boycott. The trial court
granted summary judgment for defendant and this was affirmed. The
court held that not all refusals to deal are per se illegal and that, when no
horizontal element is involved, plaintiff must show an anticompetitive
motive.' 6 After surveying the evidence, the court found good business reasons for the termination at issue which refuted the charge of anticompetitive intent. Indeed, the court affirmed the lower court's conclusion that
the business justifications for the termination were sufficiently strong that
it could not even be found unreasonable in a rule of reason evaluation.
Similar thinking dominated the other vertical refusal to deal case, General Chemicals, Inc. v. Exxon Chemical Co."1 In the process of operating
a chemical refinery, Exxon produced five million tons of polyethylene
scrap per year. While the scrap had some value, Exxon had no way to
42. Id. at 553-65. For a discussion of two procedural points in the case see text accompanying notes 82 and 83, infra.
43. 618 F.2d 1140 (5th Cir. 1980).
44. Id. at 1145.
45. Id.
46. The case was primarily concerned with the scope of the McCarran-Ferguson Act's
exemption for the business of insurance, discussed in text accompanying notes 67-69, infra.
47. 611 F.2d 102 (1980). Plaintiff alleged a vertical boycott; the court also properly held
that the McCarran-Ferguson Act, by its own terms, did not provide an exemption for boycott activities. See 15 U.S.C. § 1013(b) (1976).
48. See notes 5-8 supra, and accompanying text.
49. 625 F.2d 1231 (5th Cir. 1980).
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store it and regularly sold it by quarterly bids. In the bids for three quarterly periods, plaintiff was the high bidder. Plaintiff got part of the business for two of those periods and none for the third; most of the scrap
was sold to Bamberger Compounds. Plaintiff brought this action claiming
a conspiracy to put it out of business6 0 The court affirmed summary
judgment for defendant. Absent an anticompetitive motive, Exxon could
sell to whomever it wished and plaintiff presented no plausible theory of
conspiracy. In addition, there was some hint in the opinion that Exxon
may have been choosing its buyer on the basis of ability to move the polyethylene quickly and on schedule, rather than on the price. Taken together, these cases seem to indicate strongly that claims of vertical conspiracy to boycott will face difficulty when confronted with good business
purposes for the activity.
A tying claim was presented and quickly disposed of in Ogden Food
Service Corp. v. Mitchell." Plaintiff sold concession supplies to Mitchell
and was going to provide concession services. In addition, plaintiff was to
supply capital to be used in defendant's theaters if defendant supplied
financial statements and other material. Defendant failed to supply the
statements, so plaintiff never supplied the capital. Plaintiff sued in quantumrnmeruit for concession supplies and services delivered and never paid
for. Defendant presented a tying counterclaim." Judgment for plaintiff
was affirmed in the face of the defendant's claim. The trial court had
charged that coercion is a requirement for illegal tying and this charge
was affirmed on appeal.58 While the court was correct in citing a number
of precedents for this coercion requirement, there is serious question
whether it is sound antitrust policy." It is submitted that the real issue is
50. Id. In addition to the claimed Sherman Act conspiracy, plaintiff also amended his
complaint to add a Robinson-Patman Act claim. The court read the language of the Robinson-Patman Act literally to apply to discrimination in price on commodities sold for use or
resale within the United States. Here all of the polyethylene scrap was sold for export, so
the Robinson-Patman Act did not apply. In addition, plaintiff had originally made a contract claim. Id. at 1233 n.3. This claim was abandoned.
51. 614 F.2d 1001 (5th Cir. 1980).
52. Id. In addition, defendant presented a counterclaim under the Texas Deceptive
Trade Practices Act. TEx. Bus. & CoM. CODE AxN. § 17.46 (West Supp. 1980) The lower
court refused to submit this claim to the jury because no proof of deception had been offered; this ruling was affirmed.
53. 614 F.2d at 1003 n.4. The jury also found that there was no market power in the
tying product.
54. For recent discussions of this coercion doctrine, see Note, Tying Arrangements and
the Individual Coercion Doctrine, 30 VANco. L. Rzv. 755 (1977); Varner, Voluntary Ties
Under the Sherman Act, 50 So. CAL. L. Rzv. 271 (1977); Dore, The "Total Product" Approach to Analysis of Alleged Tying Arrangements, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 409 (1977). It
does seem that other requirements of tying law will excuse the truly uncoerced tie. When
there is no market power in the tying product the tie cannot be coerced. A requirement of a
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whether there is a tie or simply a voluntary purchase of two separate
items. A coercion requirement focuses on the murky question of buyer
motives rather than on the impact on competition. In addition, a coercion
requirement is not responsive to traditional antitrust concerns that competing sellers not be foreclosed by tying arrangements.
Only one Fifth Circuit case concerned distributor termination. Copper
Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co." is, perhaps, one of the last chapters in
this lengthy saga. The case was originally filed in 1970. Plaintiff alleged
that defendant distributor stopped selling its beer because the beer was
used as a loss leader. A prior jury verdict for plaintiff was reversed on the
questions of proof of damage causation and amount. On retrial, the jury
awarded $15,000 in damages which was trebled by the district court. After a careful review of the different measures of damages the testimony in
this case, the Fifth Circuit upheld the damages award.56 It appeared that
the jury awarded plaintiff's likely gross profit from the date of termination until the plaintiff went out of business. The court found that there
was substantial evidence supporting the jury's evaluation of this amount
of damages.

IV. EXEMPTIONS AND IMMUNITIES
All four of the exemption and immunities cases decided by the Fifth
Circuit this year concerned express or implied antitrust immunity arising
from industry regulation. This section will first discuss the two cases concerned with immunity under the Communications Act.5" A discussion of
the case concerned with antitrust immunity for collective railroad ratemaking and then the case concerned with immunity for the insurance industry under the McCarran-Ferguson Act,5 8 respectively, will follow.
Both cases concerned with immunity under the Communications Act
gave a restrictive scope to that immunity. Mid-Texas Communications

finding of explicit coercion will make the trial of many cases, especially class actions, more
difficult. Additionally, such a requirement would necessitate an inquiry into the difficult
question of why the buyer purchased the tied goods. The inquiry is difficult; the evidence
adduced is likely to be the result of after the fact strategic conduct, and it would increase
the potential problem of protecting competitors rather than competition.
55. 624 F.2d 575 (5th Cir. 1980).
56. Id. at 580. The court surmised that the jury was awarding gross profits of one dollar
per case, 250 cases per month, for the five year period from the termination date until the
date plaintiff went out of business. This would result in a total of $15,000, before trebling.
The trial court's award of $45,000 in attorney's fees was reversed and remanded. Id. at 58284. See text accompanying notes 88 and 89, infra, for discussion of attorney's fees.
57. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1976).
58. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1976).
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Systems, Inc. v. AT&T 59 concerned a Bell System refusal to interconnect
with phone service proposed to be provided by an independent phone
company to a new town. The new town developers eventually had the
Bell System provide the phone service. A jury verdict for plaintiff was

reversed and remanded on other grounds. 0 The Bell System claimed that

the common carrier obligation imposed upon it by section 201(A) of the
Communications Act,61 together with the FCC jurisdiction over interconnection questions granted by the same provision, created an implied im-

munity from the antitrust laws. It argued that it is required to consider
public interest factors in the interconnection decision because of the common carrier obligation. Thus, Bell argued, there should be no antitrust
liability for decisions made on this criteria. The Fifth Circuit agreed with

the trial court's conclusion that no immunity should be granted. Complete immunity was not necessary for the regulatory scheme to function
effectively in this area." In addition, the regulatory system may not adequately protect competition because, while the FCC considers the public
interest in promoting competition in its decisions, it considers other factors also. Furthermore, the FCC cannot give a private plaintiff relief.
However, the court did hold that the demands of the regulatory system
and the specific FCC power to order interconnection had to be considered
in evaluating whether the Bell System had monopoly power and whether
that power had been misused in this case.61 Consistent with recent precedents, the court also held that there was no implied immunity resulting
from state law regulation because the conduct in question was neither
commanded or required by that regulation."

59. 615 F.2d 1372 (5th Cir. 1980).
60. Id.
61. 47 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1976).
62. 615 F.2d at 1379-80. See P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 13, § 224(f) (1978), for
a discussion of this specific problem. The commentators are in agreement that the precedents determining the scope of the regulated industries exemption from antitrust coverage
are not completely consistent because there are really several different rules. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 6, §§ 238-39; P. AlEEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 13, §§ 222-27.
63. 615 F.2d at 1377-81. This opinion did leave the jury extremely ambiguous questions.
First, did the Bell System operating company have power to exclude, in the face of the FCC
power to order interconnection? Second, did the Bell System have an anticompetitive intent
or a public service intent in denying the interconnection? In addition, what happens if the
Bell System had both intents? Third, how long would plaintiff's monopoly have lasted had
it been permitted to provide the service as a monopolist?
64. Id. at 1381-82. The court cites Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1978); it
could also have cited California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc. 445
U.S. 97 (1980). The court also held that no Noerr-Penningtonimmunity existed. This part
of the opinion was clearly correct; the questions presented were straightforward and simply
not worthy of further comment. The conduct here complained of did not consist of approaching the FTC.
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Similar reasoning was used in Midland Television Co. v. Midessa Telecasting Co. 5 Plaintiff operated a UHF television station. Defendants
owned the local network stations and were two of four joint venturers in a
local cable T.V. company. The cable company carried all three network
stations. Although plaintiff's station was located in a nearby town, the
cable company did not carry its signal. The trial court granted a summary
judgment for defendants on implied immunity and standing grounds; the
Fifth Circuit reversed on both." Defendants claimed that FCC regulation
of cable television created an implied immunity from the antitrust laws.
The court disagreed, noting that FCC rules did not prohibit defendants
from carrying plaintiff's signal and might even require that the signal be
carried. The decision not to carry the signal was one taken in the exercise
of defendants' independent business judgment. Consequently, the possible antitrust recovery would not upset the system of regulation, so immunity was not necessary for effective operation of the system. The case was
remanded for trial.7

Unlike the two cases discussed above, Florida East Coast Railway v.
United States" concerned an express statutory grant of immunity. Plaintiff railroads were the Southern Ports Foreign Freight Commission, operating under an ICC approved rate-making agreement. Traditionally, these
agreements have been given express antitrust immunity under section
5(a) of the Interstate Commerce Act." However, the 1976 Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act'0 (the 4-R Act) narrowed this exemption. Specifically, when collective approval is sought for an interline
rate, the only railroads which can take part in the rate bureau collective
approval are the ones which can "practicably participate" in that interline movement. 71 Plaintiffs proposed that "practicably participate" be defined to include a carrier who "participates in a route as published in a
tariff on file with the Interstate Commerce Commission from an origin
involved to a destination involved.'7 2 The Federal Trade Commission ob65. 617 F.2d 1141 (5th Cir. 1980).
66. Id. The standing issue was a straightforward one and was given relatively brief treatment by the court. Plaintiff alleged a conspiracy to exclude it from the market; if these
allegations were proved to be true, plaintiff would clearly be within the sector of the economy threatened by breakdown of competition as a result of the conspiracy.
67. Plaintiff had also presented a section 2 monopolization claim which had not been
ruled on by the trial court below and was not treated in this appeal. 617 F.2d at 1143-44 n.4.
68. 623 F.2d 391 (5th Cir. 1980).
69. 49 U.S.C. § 5b (1976).
70. Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-210, 90
Stat. 31 (codified in scattered sections of 45, 49 U.S.C.).
71. 49 U.S.C. § 10706(a)(3)(A)(i) (Supp. III 1979).
72. 625 F.2d at 393. The ICC originally approved this definition. 355 ICC 216, 230
(1977). This approval was later reversed.
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jected on two grounds before the ICC. First, a carrier could participate in
the collective rate-making by filing a tariff for a hypothetical alternative
route, even if it were never actually used. Second, the FCC objected that
anticompetitive rate-making would result from vote trades among participating and nonparticipating carriers. The ICC eventually agreed with the
FTC and adopted its restrictive definition of "whether the carrier currently participates in the movement or has participated in it within the
past two years. '7' The court found the ICC's construction of the statute
reasonable and upheld it.74 The legislative intent was to limit rate-making
participation to those carriers who could actually move the goods. By focusing on recent participation in moving the goods, the ICC rule comports with this legislative intent. Under plaintiff's definition, virtually any
railroad would be able to figure out a hypothetical alternative route and
participate. Such a result would, in the court's view, clearly violate the
intent of the statute.75 The ICC order was enforced.
The final immunities case concerned the scope of the McCarran-Ferguson Act exemption for the "business of insurance" in section 2(b).7 1 In St.
Bernard Hospital v. Hospital Services Association, Inc.,7 7 defendant was
the local Blue Cross affiliate and plaintiff was a contracting hospital.
Plaintiff objected to the way defendant computed costs paid "contracting
hospitals" based on the costs of "participating" nonprofit hospitals. Defendant argued that its contract to pay specified parts of the bills from
"contracting hospitals," such as plaintiff, was part of the exempt "business of insurance." Summary judgment by the trial court based on the
immunity was reversed. The court adopted the standard that "the primary elements of an insurance contract are the spreading and underwriting of a policyholder's risk."70 In this case, the contract to pay for specific
hospital services was not part of the "business of insurance" because it
did not involve the spreading and underwriting of a policyholder's risk.
Thus, the exemption did not apply and the case was remanded for trial.
V.

PROCEDURAL POINTS

The Fifth Circuit's 1980 antitrust decisions provided several interesting
73.

358 ICC 696 (1978). The ICC did broaden the FTC's proposed definition to include

new carriers who would actually move the goods under the proposed tariff, as well as those
who had moved them in the last two years. 623 F.2d at 393 n.7.
74. Id. at 394.
75. Id.
76. The McCarran-Ferguson Act exemption for the business of insurance is at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1012(b) (1976).
77. 618 F.2d 1140 (5th Cir. 1980).
78. Id. at 1143, quoting Group Life and Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205
(1979).
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procedural holdings. This discussion will first treat the procedural points9
raised in the three opinions arising from the corrugated box case.7
Problems related to the interstate commerce jurisdictional requirements,
the scope of Federal Trade Commission's civil investigative demand jurisdiction, and pretrial motions will then be discussed.
The preliminary skirmishes in the In re Corrugated Container AntiTrust Litigation presented three interesting procedural questions. The
most substantial one was an appeal from denial of a motion to disqualify
the trial judge. Ddfendant's objections to the trial judge arose from evidentiary rulings that he had made in a previous criminal case involving
one of the four defendants. In the course of those evidentiary rulings, the
trial judge had found a sufficient likelihood of conspiracy to admit the
disputed evidence of the conspiracy. Defendants contended that this
showed bias or prejudice." The court first held that the denial of the
motion to disqualify is reviewable only on appeal from a final judgment
and is not reviewable at this preliminary stage. Alternatively, the court
held that the requisite personal, nonjudicial bias was not shown. Previous
rulings in related cases concerning one of the four defendants did not
show bias. Furthermore, the judge's out of court comment that the government mishandled the case and that defendants were guilty in the
criminal case, as alleged by affidavit from one of plaintiff's lawyers,
showed only judicial observations and not personal bias.81 In an, earlier
opinion involving the same case, defendant brought an appeal contesting
the notice sent to absent class members.6 2 In that opinion also, the Fifth
Circuit had held that the appeal was untimely because no appealable order had yet been entered. The court expressed concern that any other
result would make every notice order an appealable one. The third evidentiary opinion concerned a refusal to answer civil deposition questions
on fifth amendment grounds. The trial court ordered defendants to answer and held them in contempt when they refused. All three defendants
had presented evidence identical to that sought before the grand jury in
the prior criminal case; two were given use immunity, and the third was
promised use immunity after a transcribed interview. 8 The trial judge
79. In re Corrugated Container Anti-Trust Litigation, 611 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1980); 614
F.2d 958 (5th Cir. 1980); 620 F.2d 1086 (5th Cir. 1980).
80. 614 F.2d at 963-66. There was also evidence of claimed prejudicial statements by the
trial judge's law clerk. While the court noted that these were improper, they were only observations made as a result of observing the trial and did not reflect a personal bias.
81. Id. at 966-67 n.19.
82. 611 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1980). Defendant sought review under the doctrine of Cohen,
which permits interlocutory review of decisions which conclusively determine claims of right
severable from and collateral to the main action. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp.,
337 U.S. 541 (1949).
83. 620 F.2d 1086 (5th Cir. 1980). In taking the deposition of Fleischacker, the trial
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ruled that the evidence requested duplicated that for which immunity
had already been given, so there was no possibility of subsequent prosecution. However, the court of appeals found a possibility of prosecution
which was more than "fanciful." The evidence was incriminating and the
possibility of future prosecution existed. Judge Johnson, dissenting, argued that the court could make the prospective judgment that this immunized testimony would be "tainted" in any subsequent criminal prosecution because a later use of it would be a derivative use."
Two cases dealt with interstate commerce requirements. Jim Walter
Corp. v. FTC8 was a merger case brought against the parent holding
company. The court held that the holding company was engaged in interstate commerce because it was actively involved in the management of
subsidiaries. The court further observed that any other result would permit use of the holding company device as a shield to avoid the purposes
of section 7 of the Clayton Act." The case was remanded for further consideration of geographic market definition, product market definition and
the need for an environmental impact statement. 7 S&M Materials Com-

pany v. Southern Stone Co." was concerned with the more exacting interstate commerce requirement of the Robinson-Patman Act.8 ' Defendant
ran a dolemite rock quarry and some downstream processing operations.
When plaintiff attempted to compete with one of these processing operations, defendant raised plaintiff's price by fifty percent. Plaintiff alleged a
violation of the Robinson-Patman Act which requires both that the discriminator be engaged in commerce and that one of the purchases which
judge was sitting by agreement as a district court judge in the southern district of New

York. Thus, as to defendant Fleischacker, the Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of
jurisdiction. The appeal should have been brought in the Second Circuit. Id. at 1090-91.
84. Id. at 1093 (Johnson, J., dissenting). The Second Circuit has recently agreed with
Judge Johnson's dissent in a decision addressing the issue of immunity for one of the defendants in the Corrugated Container litigation. The Court held that when a civil deposition
concerns the same subjects as the immunized testimony, the deposition is a "derived" use of
that testimony and cannot be used against the witness.
In re Corrugated Container Anti-Trust Litigation, 1005 Antiturst & Trade Reg. Rep.
(BNA) Q-1 (Mar. 12, 1981).
85. 625 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1980). The court also observed that, if both the acquiring and
the acquired corporation are in commerce, the holding company may not need to be. Id. at
680 n.5.
86. Id. at 680-81; 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
87. The evidence of geographic market, consisting of casual observations of three industrial representatives and one economist, was held insufficient. The court declined to rule on
plaintiff's claim that an environmental impact statement was required as part of this FTC
action, but did observe that this claim was "(s]ufficiently serious to warrant closer attention
than it was given." Id. at 684 n.11.
88. 612 F.2d 198 (5th Cir. 1980).
89. 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1976).
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constitute the discrimination be made in commerce.9" While defendant
clearly was engaged in interstate commerce, it sold no dolemite in interstate commerce. Thus, the jurisdictional requirement was not met and
summary judgment for defendant was affirmed.
Questions concerning the scope of a Federal Trade Commission civil
investigative demand were presented in FTC v. Turner." The FTC had
previously issued a cease and desist order against defendant. In this case
it was seeking to enforce an investigative subpoena asking about defendant's financial resources. The subpoena was issued in the process of deciding whether to bring a civil damage action against defendant for redress. Judgment for defendant was affirmed. While the FTC has broad
powers to investigate whether there has been a violation of the law, it is
not authorized to investigate the financial resources of a defendant prior
to an award of civil damages. Despite recent expansion, the investigatory
powers of the FTC are limited to investigation of whether a violation of
the law exists. The court analogized to Rule 69(A) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure," which authorizes such discovery only after judgment.
Judge Brown, dissenting, emphasized the general breadth of the FTC's
powers, the specific recent expansion of the FTC's subpoena powers, and
the general policy of protecting consumers. He particularly disagreed with
the analogy to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, differentiating the
public role of the FTC from that of private parties. Balancing the competing interests, he would have held for the FTC in this case.
Two cases concerned pretrial motions. In Pan-Islamic Trade Corp. v.
Exxon Corp.,"9 the court found no abuse of discretion when the trial
court refused to allow plaintiff to amend its complaint. Plaintiff did not
have standing to bring four of the five antitrust violations it wished to
allege in the amendment, and, after a careful review of the facts, the
court found no prejudice to plaintiff on the fifth count. The court also
held that there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court's limitation
on discovery. After the original complaint was filed, a period of two years
and two months elapsed. In response to a request, plaintiff then said it
would need an additional six months for discovery and this was granted;
this period was subsequently extended by three more months to take
depositions for which notice had been given but which had not actually
been taken." The court emphasized plaintiff's lack of diligence in pursuing discovery, particularly in the agreed six months time period. Ware v.
90. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976). The statute also requires that the effect of the discrimination be to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly.
91. 609 F.2d 743 (5th Cir. 1980).
92. FED. R. Cv. P. 69(A).
93. 632 F.2d 539 (5th Cir. 1980).
94. Id. at 548-53.
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Associated Milk Producers,Inc.95 was a per curiam reversal of the trial
court's grant of a motion to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds.
Defendant filed a motion titled "Motion to Dismiss or for Summary
Judgment or in the Alternative for a More Definite Statement and Protective Order" together with two affidavits attached. Plaintiff filed an affidavit in response. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, considering only the face of the complaint. Since the affidavits were not
considered, it was within the discretion of the trial court to treat this as a
motion to dismiss rather than a motion for summary judgment. However,
the motion should not have been granted because the complaint could be
construed to allege monopolistic acts within the four year limiations period. In addition, plaintiff alleged facts which, if proved, could constitute
a bar to the statute of limitations by showing that the damages were too
speculative when the monopolization originally existed." Thus, the motion to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds was not well founded
and the case was remanded.
VI.

MISCELLANEOUS

Two additional Fifth Circuit decisions deserve mention. United States
v. Northside Realty Associates, Inc." concerned an attempt by a criminal
defendant to discover an internal, preindictment documents prepared by
the Atlanta field office of the Justice Department Antitrust Division. The
document had recommended indictment. The Operations Office of the
Antitrust Division then offered the customary preindictment conference.
The government simply listens at this conference and the defendant's
lawyers are given an opportunity to argue that the defendant should not
be indicted. In this case, defendant moved for production of the Altanta
office memorandum recommending indictment and a copy of the procedures for recommending and conducting the conference. Defendant argued that the government's own rules required the conference, and this
disclosure was required in order to make it a meaningful conference. The
district court ordered the Justice Department to give defendant a summary of the facts pertinent to the discussion,"' and both sides appealed.
The Fifth Circuit held for the government on three different grounds.
95. 614 F.2d 413 (5th Cir. 1980).
96. Id. at 415, citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321 (1971).
97. 613 F.2d 501 (5th Cir. 1980). Excel Handbag Co. v. Edison Bros. Stores, Inc., 630
F.2d 379 (5th Cir. 1980) presented a claim of price discrimination violating the RobinsonPatman Act based on the fact of commercial bribery. The jury found no bribery; in the long
opinion dealing primarily with matters of commercial bribery and procedural questions, the
court dismissed the Robinson-Patman Act claim in two paragraphs.
98. 613 F.2d at 503.
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First, the separation of powers doctrine forbids the judicial branch from
taking action which hampers the executive branch in performing its constitutionally assigned duty. The executive branch has discretionary power
to control criminal prosecutions. The order which defendant sought
would interfere with the exercise of that power by making this kind of
preindictment conference less likely and more troublesome. Second, requirements of grand jury secrecy prohibited disclosure of the Atlanta office memo. This memo was likely to disclose facts, sources and other evidence before the grand jury. Grand jury secrecy is particularly important
in antitrust cases to protect the identity of grand jury witnesses who are
likely to have ongoing commercial relations with potential defendants. In
that circumstance, disclosure of the memo was likely to effect the willingness of many of the witnesses to testify. This concern was magnified by
the fact that the grand jury was still sitting. Third, the Atlanta office
memorandum was an intra-agency document and these documents were
privileged from disclosure. The court concluded that defendant had no
right to any of the disclosure sought and the order of the district court
was reversed.
Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., was a distributor termination
case and was discussed above." While the court upheld the award of
damages, its reversal on attorney's fees is worthy of comment. The district court correctly identified the twelve relevant criteria and made findings of fact on each of those, but it made no explanation of how the specific $45,000 attorney's fee award was related to those findings of fact.
Indeed, the fact that the attorney's fees equaled the amount of treble
damages gave the appearance that the trial court was simply implementing the contingent fee agreement between the parties.100 In view of the
time and effort which the case had consumed, the court was concerned
that this amount might be inadequate. The case is in keeping with the
recent trend to require greater specificity in the award of attorney's fees
in antitrust cases.

99. 624 F.2d 575 (1980). See notes 55-56 supra, and accompanying text.
100. The compensation agreement between plaintiffs and their counsel provided that
counsel would receive the greater of court-awarded fees or one half of the total of courtawarded fees and damages.

